We can approach it by taking into account some general principles that a correspondence theory would like to add to its central principle to concretize its theory. The first principle of this kind is that the correspondence relationship must not disintegrate into identity – “It takes two to make a truth” (Austin 1950, p. 118): Correspondence theories emphasize that true beliefs and true statements correspond to the real state of things.  This kind of theory emphasizes a relationship between thoughts or statements on one side and things or objects on the other. It is a traditional model that goes back to its origins to ancient Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.  This class of theories says that the truth or falsity of a representation is in principle determined exclusively by how it relates to “things,” if it accurately describes those “things.” A classic example of correspondence theory is the statement of the thirteenth-century philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas: “Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus” (“Truth is the alignment of things and intellect”) that Aquinas attributed to the ninth-century Neoplatonist Isaac Israeli.  Aquinas also affirmed the theory as follows: “A judgment is considered true if it corresponds to the external reality.”  Pragmatists like C. S. Peirce sees truth as a kind of essential relationship with human practices for exploring and discovering the truth, Peirce himself believing that truth is what human inquiry would discover in a case if our practice of inquiry went as far as it could be profitable: “Opinion, which can ultimately agree with all who study, this is what we see by truth…” Because it is the most privileged theory, and for reasons of expediency and consistency, the theory that statements – not sentences – carry values of truth is repeated in this article. When we talk about “truths” below, we are referring to real statements. It should be noted, however, that virtually all of the claims made below have correspondences in nominal theories that reject statements. This approach focuses on the principle of truth or truth: all truth has a creator of truth; Or alternatively, for any truth, there is something that makes it reality. The principle is generally seen as the expression of a realistic attitude that emphasizes the decisive contribution that the world makes to the truth of a proposition.
Proponents tend to treat the theory of truth primarily as a guide to ontology and ask: to what ontological categories are we attached as truth-makers of statements that we accept as true? Most proponents argue that statements of different logical types can be made by elements of different ontological categories: for example. B statements of certain types are evidenced by facts, others only by individual things, others by events, others by tropics (cf. for example.